Why US was upset with Shastri
Shastri’s tenure as PM triggered ‘Indianisation’ and a marked move away from the US towards the USSR; he along with Homi Bhabha could have turned India into a nuclear state quickly following China’s nuclear tests in 1964
Lal Bahadur Shastri was a PM that India wanted but not the world. He became the PM in trying circumstances – Nehru had passed away after the shocking betrayal by the “friendly” Chinese, and a war with Pakistan on both fronts was imminent.
However, Shastri galvanised not only the army but the entire nation to stand up together and India won the war with Pakistan while becoming more and more self-reliant.
Further, he was not a pliant PM. While Shastri took a long time to hold discussions before making a decision, he was steadfast once the decisions were made. It won’t be wrong to say the perception of India changed drastically with Shastri as the PM after Nehru who was considered as more cosmopolitan.
In a declassified report, the CIA says, “A year after Nehru’s fatal stroke, the style of the Indian government and the ruling Congress party has changed rather markedly. Most striking is the transformation of the office of the prime minister, which used to embody Nehru’s imperious, cosmopolitan personality but now reflects the colourless, homespun, consensus-minded character of his successor as leaded of 470 million Indians, Lal Bahadur Shastri.”
Nehru was praised for the stability in Punjab and J&K, but CIA also said he frequently “closed his eyes to rank corruption and bullying” which made that stability possible. Food price crisis was one of the problems that Nehru left behind – hence, Shastri’s famous slogan: Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan.
It also said about Shastri, “He is a common-man oriented, quotes heavily from Gandhi, and is infinitely more Indian than Nehru.”
About foreign affairs, the CIA said, “He [Shastri] is aware that with Nehru’s death and with India’s closer association with the US, its influence in Asian- African circles has progressively eroded.” This enabled Pakistan and China to play a dominant role and made India “less attractive” to the USSR.
With respect to the US, Shastri’s policies remained friendly but new strains had appeared, according to the CIA. “These have resulted from Washington’s postponement of his proposed visit to the US, his reaction in cancelling out altogether, and India’s unhappiness with Pakistan’s use of American military aid equipment in the recent Rann of Kutch episode.”
Obviously, the US was worried about Shastri. Not only did India win the war against Pakistan, which the US supported, he was also moving away from the US, rapidly. “Moscow was quick to capitalize on these strains, during Shastri’s recent visit to the Soviet Union,” the CIA said.
The CIA concluded, “In a sense, India in the post-Nehru period is undergoing its second Indianisation since independence was achieved. The first occurred when the British sahibs left, turning over their jobs to the brown sahibs they had trained.
“A second so-called Indianisation refers not only to the replacement of Nehru by a thoroughly home-grown product but also to the stepped-up retirement of the old brown sahibs in the Indian civil service and in the Parliament and their replacement by the Indian-trained element.”
Clearly, in his silent indomitable manner, Shastri was changing the entire “system”. This was a major reason for the animosity in the West. However, though considered the doves, along with world famous Nuclear Physicist Homi J Bhabha, with respect to the nuclear bomb, it was clear that the China risk was also changing India’s policy.
The brilliant nuclear scientist that he was, Bhabha had a blueprint of India’s nuclear programme years before India achieved independence. He also persuaded Jawaharlal Nehru about the benefits of such a programme even as he started preliminary work at the Indian Institute of Science in 1944.
Nehru allowed Bhabha to start the programme, though CIA records note that there was lack of political will to make India nuclear until Shastri became the PM. Bhabha was even nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physics twice – in 1951 and 1953. But after China’s nuclear tests in 1964, and following the treacherous Indo-Sino war of 1962, Bhabha started openly advocating the importance of an Indian nuclear deterrent.
While Shastri was guarded, he and Bhabha were likely accelerating a programme to produce a nuclear deterrent following China’s hostility and the US’ indifference despite its promise to counter China.
Another declassified document (dated 22 October 1964) by the CIA states, “The government of India has all of the elements needed to produce a nuclear weapon and it has the capability to assemble a bomb quickly.”
“India does not plan to commence work on the bomb as yet because the GoI is convinced the Chicoms (China communists) will not have an offensive nuclear capability for at least five years. In the meantime, should the situation change, India is relying on President Johnson’s [Lyndon B Johnson; 1963 – 1965; Democratic; after Kennedy] assurances to come to the aid of any nation menaced by China.”
China’s first major nuclear test took place on 16 October 1964. Shastri was India’s Prime Minister from 9 June 1964 – 11 January 1966. It is widely believed that Shastri was poisoned after a meeting with Pakistani leadership (Ayub Khan, who Shastri was reluctant to meet with in the US; the reason behind postponement of his scheduled visit by President Johnson and later the cancelation by Shastri) in Russia after a deal that allegedly carried his forged/forced signature.
Homi Bhabha died in a plane crash 13 days later on 24 January 1966, after a bomb reportedly exploded in the cargo section of the air plane, over the Alps in Europe.